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Abstract
This article deals with empty spacetime and the question of its physical
reality. By “empty spacetime” we mean a collection of bare spacetime points,
the remains of ridding spacetime of all matter and fields. We ask whether
these geometric objects—themselves intrinsic to the concept of field—might
be observable through some physical test. By taking quantum-mechanical
notions into account, we challenge the negative conclusion drawn from the
diffeomorphism invariance postulate of general relativity, and we propose new
foundational ideas regarding the possible observation—as well as conceptual
overthrow—of this geometric ether.
Keywords: Empty spacetime; Spacetime points; Diffeomorphism invariance;
Geometric ether; Spacetime correlations.
1 Introduction
Since its inception, the ether has proved a troubled notion which, contrary to
common belief, still haunts physics at the turn of a new century. What can one
learn from the history of this ether and in what sense is it still of utmost concern
to physics?
The need for an ether as a material medium with mechanical properties first
became apparent to Descartes in the first half of the seventeenth century in an
attempt to avoid any actions that would propagate, through nothing, from a dis-
tance. During its history of roughly three centuries in its original conception, the
idea of the ether managed to materialize in endless forms via the works of countless
investigators. Its main purpose of providing a medium through which interactions
could propagate remained untouched, but the actual properties with which it was
endowed in order to account for and unify an ever-increasing range of phenomena
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were mutually incongruent and dissimilar. Never yielding to observation and con-
stantly confronted by gruelling difficulties, the mechanical ether had to reinvent
itself continually, but its very notion staggered not a bit.
After almost 300 years of bitter struggle, the mechanical ether eventually gave
in. The first step of this change took place in the hands of Lorentz, for whom
the ether was a sort of substantial medium that affected bodies moving through
it not mechanically but only dynamically, i.e. due to the fact that bodies moved
through it. Drude and Larmor further declared that the ether need not actually
be substantial at all but simply space with physical properties. The second and
decisive step in this de-mechanization of the ether was brought about by Poincare´
and Einstein through ideas that eventually took the shape of the special relativity
theory. In Einstein’s (1983) own words, this change “consisted in taking away from
the ether its last mechanical quality, namely, its immobility” (p. 11).
Far from being dead, however, the ether had only transmuted its character—
from a mechanical substance to an absolute inertial spacetime. The need for re-
garding inertial spacetime as an ether came after noticing that “empty” spacetime,
despite being unobservable and unalterable, displayed physical properties, such as
providing a reference for acceleration via its geodesics.
The nature of this new ether underwent yet another change with the theory
of general relativity. According to Einstein (1961, p. 176), the ether was now
spacetime’s dynamic and intrinsic metric content. This was so significant a change
that it modified the very ideas of ether and empty spacetime. By making metric
spacetime alterable, it actually put an end to its status as a genuine ether. And by
making the metric field a content of spacetime, it did away with empty spacetime,
since now to vacate spacetime means to be left with nothing at all. In fact, one is
left with something: the spacetime points; however, these had been denied physical
reality by Einstein’s hole argument. From this standpoint, Einstein concluded that
empty spacetime cannot possess any physical properties, i.e. that empty spacetime
does not exist.
It is the purpose of this article to challenge the certainty of this conclusion.
The way to achieve this will be connected with the main ideas presented in our
previous article (Meschini, Lehto, & Piilonen, 2005), where the need to study the
problem of the nature of empty spacetime (i) equipped with quantum theory and
some guiding physical principle directly relevant to its existence—here proposed to
be that of diffeomorphism invariance—and (ii) from a non-geometric point of view
was put forward. The first requirement stemmed from the simple fact that, without
an appropriate guiding light, the search for new ideas becomes pure guesswork; the
second originated from the observation that any genuinely new understanding of
empty spacetime may require going beyond its geometric characterization entirely
(further reasons justifying this second requirement will be given in this article). In
particular both these observations were turned into criticisms of what is currently
understood as pregeometry—there deemed a considerable incongruity.
When further heeding the history of the ether, the question of the physical
existence of empty spacetime must also involve that observables intrinsic to empty
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spacetime be found so as to be able to support any sound claim as to its reality.
The present article constitutes the beginning of this endeavour.
2 The mechanical ether
It is appropriate to start this investigation by tracing the rich history of the ether,
starting here from its older conception as a material substance, passing through its
virtual disappearance after the progressive removal of its mechanical attributes, and
ending with its new form of an immaterial, geometric substratum, as analyzed in the
next two sections. For the historical review of this section, the very comprehensive
work of Whittaker (1951) will be followed as a guideline.1
Rene´ Descartes (1596–1650) was the first to introduce the conception of an ether
as a mechanical medium. Given his belief that action could only be transmitted by
means of pressure and impact, he considered that the effects at a distance between
bodies could only be explained by assuming the existence of a medium filling up
space—an ether. He gave thus a new meaning to this name, which in its original
Greek (αι`θη´ρ) had meant the blue sky or the upper air. The ether was unobservable
and yet it was needed to account for Descartes’ mechanistic view of the universe,
given his said assumptions.2 At the same time, the notion of an ether was right
from its inception entwined with considerations about the theory of light. Descartes
himself explained the propagation of light as a transmission of pressure from a first
type of matter to be found in vortices around stars to a second type of matter, that
of which he believed the ether to be constituted. (pp. 5–9)
The history of the ether continued tied to the theory of light with Robert Hooke’s
(1635–1703) work. In an improvement with respect to Descartes’ view, he conceived
of light as a wave motion, an exceedingly small vibration of luminous bodies that
propagated through a transparent and homogeneous ether in a spherical manner.
Hooke also introduced thus the fruitful idea of a wave-front. (pp. 14–15)
Isaac Newton (1642–1727) rejected Hooke’s wave theory of light on the grounds
that it could not explain the rectilinear propagation of light or its polarization (see
below). In its place, Newton proposed that light consisted of rays that interacted
with the ether to produce the phenomena of reflection, refraction and diffraction,
but that did not depend on it for their propagation. He gave several options as
to what the true nature of light might be, one of which was that it consisted of
particles—a view that later on would be associated with his name; nevertheless,
as to the nature of light, he “let every man here take his fancy.” Newton also
considered it possible for the ether to consist of different “ethereal spirits,” each
separately suited for the propagation of a different interaction. (pp. 18–20)
Regarding gravitation in the context of his universal law of attraction, Newton
1Page numbers in parentheses in this section are to Vol. 1 of this reference unless otherwise
stated.
2With his invention of the coordinate system, Descartes was, at the same time, the unwitting
precursor of the later conception of the ether as a form of space.
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did not want to pronounce himself as to its nature. He nonetheless conjectured that
it would be absurd to suppose that gravitational effects could propagate without
the mediation of an ether. However, Newton’s eighteenth century followers gave a
twist to his views; antagonizing with Cartesians due to their rejection of Newton’s
gravitational law, they went as far as denying the existence of the ether—originally
Descartes’ concept—and attempted to account for all contact interactions as actions
at a distance between particles. (pp. 30–31)
Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) was also a supporter of the wave theory of light
after observing that light rays that cross each other do not interact with one another
as would be expected of them if they were particles. Like Hooke, he also believed
that light consisted of waves propagating in an ether that penetrated vacuum and
matter alike. He managed to explain reflection and refraction by means of the
principle that carries his name, which introduced the concept of a wave front as the
emitter of secondary waves. As to gravitation, Huygens’ idea of a Cartesian ether
led him to account for it as a vortex around the Earth. (pp. 23–28)
An actual observation that would later have a bearing on the notions of the
nature of light and of the ether was that of Huygens’ regarding the polarization of
light. He observed that light refracted once through a so-called Icelandic crystal,
when refracted through a second such crystal, could or could not be seen depending
on the orientation of the latter. Newton correctly understood this result as the
first light ray being polarized, i.e. having properties dependent on the directions
perpendicular to its direction of propagation. He then concluded that this was
incompatible with light being a (longitudinal) wave, which could not carry such
properties. (pp. 27–28)
Another thoroughly Cartesian account of the ether was presented by John
Bernoulli (1710–1790), Jr., in an attempt to provide a mechanical basis for his fa-
ther’s ideas on the refraction of light. Bernoulli’s ether consisted of tiny whirlpools
and was interspersed with solid corpuscules that could never astray much from their
average locations. A source of light would temporarily condense the whirlpools
nearest to it, diminishing thus their centrifugal effects and displacing the said cor-
puscules; in this manner, a longitudinal wave would be started. (pp. 95–96)
In the midst of a general acceptance of the corpuscular theory of light in the
eighteenth century, also Leonhard Euler (1707–1783) supported the view of an ether
in connection with a wave theory of light after noticing that light could not consist
of the emission of particles from a source since no diminution of mass was observed.
Most remarkably, Euler suggested that, in fact, the same ether served as a medium
for both electricity and light, hinting for the first time at a unification of these two
phenomena. Finally, he also attempted to explain gravitation in terms of the ether,
which he assumed to have more pressure the farther from the Earth, so that the
resulting net balance of ether pressure on a body would push it towards the centre
of the Earth. (pp. 97–99)
At the turn of the century, the wave theory of light received new support in
the hands of Thomas Young (1773–1829). Within this theory, Young explained
reflection and refraction in a more natural manner than the corpuscular theory and,
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more importantly, he also accounted successfully for the phenomena of Newton’s
rings (and hinted at the cause of diffraction) by introducing an interference principle
for light waves. It was Augustin Fresnel (1788–1827) who, in 1816 and amidst an
atmosphere of hostility towards the wave theory, managed to explain diffraction in
terms of Huygens’ and Young’s earlier findings. (pp. 100–108)
Young and Fresnel also provided an alternative explanation of stellar aberra-
tion, which had been first observed by James Bradley (1692–1762) in 1728 while
searching to measure stellar parallax, and which had so far been explained in terms
of the corpuscular theory of light. Young first proposed that such effect could
be explained assuming that the Earth did not drag the ether with it, so that the
Earth’s motion with respect to it was the cause of aberration. Subsequently, Fres-
nel provided a fuller explanation that could also account for aberration being the
same when observed through refractive media. Following Young, Fresnel suggested
that material media partially dragged along the ether in such a way that the latter
would pick a fraction 1 − 1/n2 (where n is the medium’s refractive index) of the
medium’s velocity. So far the ether was viewed as a somewhat non-viscous fluid
that could be dragged along in the inside of refractive media in proportion to their
refractive index, and whose longitudinal excitations described light. (pp. 108–113)
Considerations about the polarization of light would bring along fundamental
changes to the conception of the ether. As Newton had previously observed, the
properties of polarized light did not favour a longitudinal-wave theory of light. In-
spired by the results of an experiment performed by Franc¸ois Arago (1786–1853)
and Fresnel, Young hit on the solution to the problem of polarization by proposing
that light was a transverse wave propagating in a medium. Fresnel further hypoth-
esized that the ether must then be akin to a solid and display rigidity so as to
sustain such waves. (pp. 114–117)
The fact that only a rigid ether could support transverse waves robbed the idea
of an immobile, undragged ether of much of its plausibility, since it was hard to
imagine a solid medium of some sort that would not be, at least, partially dragged
by bodies moving through it. George Stokes (1819–1903) rose up to this challenge
by providing a picture of the ether as a medium that behaved like a solid for high-
frequency waves and as a fluid for slow moving bodies. As a fluid, Stokes’ ether was
dragged along by material bodies such that, in particular, it was at rest relative to
the Earth’s surface. (pp. 128, 386–387)
Michael Faraday (1791–1867) gave a new dimension to the ether conception by
introducing the notion of field, which in hindsight was the most important concept
to be invented in this connection.3 In his studies of the induction of currents, of
the relation of electricity and chemistry, and of polarization in insulators, he put
forward the concepts of magnetic and electric lines of force permeating space. He
introduced thus the concept of a field as a stress in the ether and present where
3And this not without a sense of irony. This is so because, at first, its was on the field, a
physical entity existing on its own and needing no medium to propagate, that the overthrow of
the mechanical ether would rest; however, later on Einstein would reinstate the ether as a (metric)
field itself.
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its effects took place. He went on to suggest that an ether may not be needed if
one were to think of these lines of force—themselves part of material bodies—as
the carriers of transverse vibrations, including light and radiant heat as well. Or
then that, if there was an luminiferous ether, it might also carry magnetic force and
“should have other uses than simply the conveyance of radiations.” By including
also the magnetic field as being carried by the ether, Faraday added to Euler’s
earlier prophecy, and he hinted for the first time at the conception of light as an
electromagnetic wave. (pp. 170–197)
Another unifying association of this type was made by William Thomson (1824–
1907), who in 1846 compared heat and electricity in that the isotherms of the former
corresponded to the equipotentials of the latter. He suggested furthermore that
electric and magnetic forces might propagate as elastic displacements in a solid.
James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879), inspired by Faraday’s and W. Thomson’s ideas,
strove to make a mechanical picture of the electromagnetic field by identifying
static fields with displacements of the ether (for him equivalent to displacements
of material media) and currents with their variations. At the same time, Maxwell,
like Gustav Kirchhoff (1824–1887) before him, was impressed by the equality of the
measured velocity of light and that of electromagnetic disturbances of his theory,
and suggested that light and electromagnetic waves must be waves of the same
medium. (pp. 242–254)
So far, the theories of Maxwell and Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894) had not made
any distinction between ether and matter, with the former considered as totally
carried along by the latter. These theories were still in disagreement with Fresnel’s
successful explanation of aberration in moving refractive media, which postulated
a partial ether drag by such bodies. However, experiments to detect any motion of
the Earth with respect to the ether, such as those by Albert Michelson (1852–1931)
and Edward Morley (1838–1923), had been negative and lent support to Stokes’
theory of an ether totally dragged at the surface of the Earth. (pp. 386–392)
Not content with Stokes’ picture, in 1892 Hendrik Lorentz (1853–1928) proposed
an alternative explanation with his theory of electrons, which reconciled electromag-
netic theory with Fresnel’s law. However, Lorentz’s picture of the ether was that of
an electron-populated medium whose parts were mutually at rest; Fresnel’s partial
drag was therefore not allowed by it. Lorentz’s theory denied the ether mechani-
cal properties and considered it only space with dynamic properties (i.e. affecting
bodies because they moved through it), although still endowed it with a degree of
substantiality.4 The negative results of the Michelson-Morley experiment were then
explained by Lorentz by means of the existence of FitzGerald’s contraction, which
consisted in a shortening of material bodies by a fraction v2/2c2 of their lengths in
the direction of motion relative to the ether. Thus, the ether would cease being a
mechanical medium to become a sort of substantial, dynamic space. (pp. 392–405)
Near the end of the nineteenth century, the conception of the ether would com-
plete the turn initiated by Lorentz with the views of Paul Drude (1863–1906) and
4See (Kostro, 2000, p. 18) and (Kox, 1989, pp. 201, 207).
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Joseph Larmor (1857–1942), which entirely took away from the ether its substan-
tiality. Drude (1894, p. 9) declared:
Just as one can attribute to a specific medium, which fills space ev-
erywhere, the role of intermediary of the action of forces, one could do
without it and attribute to space itself those physical characteristics
which are now attributed to the ether.5
Also Larmor claimed that the ether should be conceived as an immaterial medium,
not a mechanical one; that one should not attempt to explain the dynamic relations
so far found in terms of
mechanical consequences of concealed structure in that medium; we
should rather rest satisfied with having attained to their exact dynami-
cal correlation, just as geometry explores or correlates, without explain-
ing, the descriptive and metric properties of space.6
Larmor’s statement is so remarkable that it will receive more attention later on in
Section 5.
Despite the seeming superfluousness of the ether even taken as a fixed dynamic
space, Lorentz held fast to the ether until his death, hoping perhaps that motion
relative to it could still somehow be detected (Kox, 1989). Others, like Poincare´
and Einstein, understood the repeated failed attempts to measure velocities with
respect to the ether as a clear sign that the ether, in fact, did not exist. Henri
Poincare´ (1854–1912) was the first to reach such a conclusion; in 1899 he asserted
that absolute motion with respect to the ether was undetectable by any means, and
that optical experiments depended only on the relative motions of bodies; in 1900
he openly distrusted the existence of the ether with the words “Our ether, does it
really exist?”; and in 1904 he proposed a principle of relativity. (Vol. 2, pp. 30–31)
It was Albert Einstein (1879–1955) who in 1905 provided a theory where he
reinstated these earlier claims but with a new, lucid interpretational basis. In
particular, Einstein considered
[T]he introduction of a “luminiferous ether”. . . to be superfluous inas-
much as the view here to be developed will not require an “absolutely
stationary space” provided with special properties. . . (Einstein, 1952a,
p. 38).
Thus, in the hands of Poincare´ and Einstein, the ether had died.
3 Einstein’s ethers
Belief in the non-existence of the ether would, nevertheless, not last very long, for
it would soon rise from its ashes—transmuted. A rebirth of the ether was now
5Quoted from (Kostro, 2000, p. 20).
6Quoted from (Whittaker, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 303).
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advocated by Einstein on the grounds that, without it, “empty” space could not
have any physical properties; yet it displayed them through the effects of absolute
acceleration.
It is a well-known fact that all motion simply cannot be reduced to the symmet-
ric relationship between any two reference systems, as Newton’s (1962, pp. 10–12)
rotating-bucket and revolving-globes (thought) experiments, and Einstein’s (1952b,
pp. 112–113) rotating-spheres thought experiment aimed to show. Some reference
frames clearly show their privileges. In Newtonian mechanics and in special rela-
tivity, these are the inertial frames; in general relativity, these are the freely-falling
frames.
Such directly unobservable frames of reference confer physical properties on
“empty” spacetime, and were held by Einstein as a new embodiment of the ether.
In order to understand Einstein’s conceptions,7 we now develop a further, tentative
characterization of the ether by distinguishing three different, possible realizations
of it.
(i) An ether is an entity that has sources and that cannot be observed directly,
although it can be observed indirectly. This is the case of physical fields such
as the metric, electric and magnetic fields, g(x), ~E(x) and ~B(x), which can
be detected through the behaviour of test particles and influenced through
changes in their sources. We name these ethers electric, magnetic, gravita-
tional, etc. ether, as the case might be.
(ii) An ether is an entity that does not have sources—therefore cannot be in-
fluenced in any way—and cannot be observed directly, although it can be
observed indirectly via the behaviour of test particles. Two constructs that
realize this notion are Newtonian space and special relativistic spacetime
(characterized by the constant metric field η). We name these ethers inertial
ethers.
(iii) An ether is an entity that does not have sources—therefore cannot be acted
upon in any way—and that “acts” but cannot be observed directly, nor indi-
rectly through its effects on test particles. This kind of ether is realized by
the spacetime points, about which much will be said below and in Sections
4 and 5. For reasons that will become clear shortly, we name this ether a
geometric ether.
Einstein called Newtonian space and the metrics of special and general relativity
ethers. What reasons lie behind these identifications?
The Newtonian and special relativistic inertial ethers above are ethers as genuine
as the mechanical one had once been. By this we mean that, after allowing for
a conceptual change from mechanical medium to geometric space, these inertial
7See (Kostro, 2000) for a useful source of material on Einstein and the ether. However, note
that this book does not deal with the issue of the hole argument and the reality of spacetime
points.
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ethers are also directly unobservable substrata that nonetheless are thought to
cause distinct effects in the observable world. While the mechanical ether—in its
endless varieties—was regarded as the cause of effects ranging from gravitational
to caloric, the inertial ethers afforded an explanation of motion.
In effect, born out by his experiments according to which (the effect of) accel-
eration was not relative and rotation in empty space was meaningful, Newton held
on to the need for a space absolutely at rest with respect to which this absolute
acceleration could be properly defined.8 Newton’s absolute space is therefore an
“old new ether” in sense (ii), since it has effects on test particles but has no sources
and cannot be affected in any way.
From the point of view of the theory of special relativity, the inertial ether
is needed for the same reasons as above, but it cannot be assigned any mechan-
ical property whatsoever—not even immobility or rest; any talk about its state
of motion is meaningless (Einstein, 1983, p. 13). This ether of special relativ-
ity is nothing other than a background inertial spacetime, i.e. an infinite family
of inertial frames linked by Lorentzian transformations. It is characterized by the
everywhere-constant metric field η and represents an indirectly observable “empty”
spacetime endowed with physical properties: it defines the standards of space, time
and motion for a test particle in an otherwise empty world.
In spite of the historical success of the inertial ethers, we need not concern
ourselves with them in this investigation. The reason is simply that, as indepen-
dent concepts, they were overthrown by the theory of general relativity. Indeed,
according to our best available understanding, the inertial ether is not an accurate
description of Nature but only applies in certain limiting situations, and can be
understood as a special case of the general relativistic metric g(x).
General relativity conferred a totally new meaning on the concept of ether—so
much so that the very notion of ether cannot be applied to metric spacetime any
longer. Like before, the physical properties of spacetime are carried by its metric
field—now g(x)—which again defines the standards of space, time and motion.
However, this metric field is a dynamic magnitude that is subject to change as
dictated by the distribution of matter. In other words, the ether is no longer
immutable but is revealed to have matter as its source, through which it can be
acted upon.
Einstein had been explicitly concerned with this problem of finding an influence-
able field to replace the prevailing immovable η. When dealing with his rotating-
spheres thought experiment, he said:
What is the reason for this difference [spherical and ellipsoidal] in the
two bodies? No answer can be admitted as epistemologically satisfac-
tory, unless the reason given is an observable fact of experience. . . [T]he
privileged space R1 [inertial] of Galileo. . . is merely a factitious cause,
and not a thing that can be observed. . . The cause must therefore lie
8In fact, only a family of inertial spaces linked by Galilean transformations would have sufficed
judging from the properties of the theory itself.
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outside this system. . . [T]he distant masses and their motions relative
to S1 and S2 [the spheres] must then be regarded as the seat of the
causes (which must be susceptible to observation) of the different be-
haviour of our two bodies S1 and S2. They take over the role of the
factitious cause R1. (Einstein, 1952b, pp. 112–113)
This shows that Einstein was looking for sources via which the physical properties
of spacetime could be influenced, and thus no longer fixed and beyond reach. In this
sense, Einstein was the first physicist since the conception of the ether to bring it
to full physical accountability (i.e. not only to passively observe its effects but also
to control its structure) by finding, through the field equation, the ether’s intimate
linkage to matter as its source. He achieved this, however, not without altering the
meaning of the original concept.
To be sure, this new property of g(x) greatly upsets its interpretation as an
ether, since it puts it on virtually the same footing as other physical fields. Indeed,
the metric field g(x) is akin to the electric field ~E(x) or magnetic field ~B(x) (or to
the electromagnetic tensor field F(x)). Whereas matter acts as the source of the
former, charges act as sources of the latter; further, e.g. like seeing a compass move
is evidence of the existence of ~B(x), so is seeing a stone fall evidence of g(x). The
presence of all these fields can thus be granted beyond reasonable doubt.9
Then, in order to understand Einstein’s views regarding g(x) as an ether, we
must recognize that the word can be meant not only in its later, negative sense of
something physically unreal but also in its more primitive sense of an underlying,
ubiquitous substratum with physical properties—even if now it were on a par with
other physical fields. While Einstein’s usage highlights the all-pervading character
of an ether, it blurs the more important issue of its physical reality or non-reality.
As we saw above, as far as observability is concerned, the metric is a physical
field analogous to the electromagnetic field; however, while the former necessarily
permeates all of spacetime (a ubiquitous substratum), the latter does not. Like
Einstein, also Weyl (1918, p. 182) recognized this point early on:
The coefficients of the fundamental metric form are therefore not simply
the potentials of the gravitational and centrifugal forces, but determine
in general which points of the universe are in reciprocal interaction. For
this reason the name “gravitational field” is perhaps too unilateral for
the reality described by this expression and should better be replaced
by the word “ether;” while the electromagnetic field should simply be
called field.10
9And yet, this comparison is not as straightforward as one might wish. While electromagnetic
fields carry physical units, the metric field does not, and neither does it result as the dimensionless
quotient of other magnitudes. This makes the indirect observability of the metric field more
intricate in comparison. It might be argued that one observes the effects of spacetime curvature
and not really of the metric field.
10Quoted from (Kostro, 2000, p. 74).
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In order to also emphasize the aspect of the issue relating to physical existence,
we reserve the use of the word “ether” in both of the said senses, i.e. for denoting
an underlying substratum that acts (has physical properties) but cannot be acted
upon or observed through physical tests.
For one or more reasons given above, this description is not realized by the
electromagnetic field, but neither by the general-relativistic metric. However, the
description is realized by the spacetime points, since these geometric objects “per-
form the localization of fields” but they cannot be observed or influenced themselves
as expressed by the diffeomorphism invariance postulate of general relativity (see
Section 4). Therefore, we call spacetime points the geometric ether.11
Finally and in the same connection, not only did general relativity change the
very notion of ether, but also that of empty spacetime. It is another feature of
g(x) that it depends on the spacetime coordinates (geometrically speaking, on its
points), so that it cannot consist of an absolute background associated with empty
spacetime as η in special relativity. On the contrary, the metric field g(x) consti-
tutes an intrinsic content12 of spacetime. Its removal means that the standards of
space, time and motion (i.e. spacetime’s geometric structure) are gone, so that not
empty spacetime but, rather, nothing remains without it (Einstein, 1961, p. 176).
Einstein’s conclusion will be amplified in Section 4, where the physical status of
what does remain—the spacetime points—will be investigated further.
4 The geometric ether
Einstein’s conclusion that spacetime, empty of its metric-field “ether,” does not
exist demands a qualification. This can be seen as soon as one realizes that, after
ridding spacetime of its geometry, it is not “nothing” which remains but the space-
time points themselves. However, when Einstein (1961, 1983) seemingly jumped to
conclusions in these (and other) expositions, he might have already been assuming
as known the results of his so-called hole argument: spacetime points are not phys-
ical either, so that they could not constitute truly empty spacetime in any physical
sense.
Given that Einstein’s field equation is generally covariant, if g(x) is a solu-
tion to it corresponding to the matter-content source T(x), then so is g′(x′) with
corresponding matter-content source T′(x′), for any continuous coordinate trans-
formation x 7→ x′. This is simply so because the same matter and metric fields
are being viewed from two different frames of reference, both being equivalent for
11Notice that this denomination would be too inclusive if we had also accepted the metric
field g(x) as an ether (or had concerned ourselves with η as one), since its character is certainly
also geometric. In any case, g(x) would have been a quantitatively geometric ether (geometric
magnitude), whereas spacetime points are only a qualitatively geometric ether (geometric object).
12Einstein (1961) distinguished space from its contents with the words: “[S]pace as opposed
to ‘what fills space,’ which is dependent on the coordinates. . . ” (p. 176) [Italics added]. This
distinction makes sense since anything that depends on the spacetime coordinates (or points)
must be in spacetime.
11
the description of Nature. Dropping the primed frame completely, how to express
T′(x′) and g′(x′) as viewed from the unprimed frame? All that needs to be done
is replace x′ by x so that the matter and metric content are now seen from S as
earlier seen from S′.
This transformation consists of the active equivalent of a transformation of
coordinates (from one reference frame to any another), and achieves its goal by
“moving” the spacetime points and not the frame of reference. The result is that,
since all frames of reference are physically equivalent, both g(x) with source T(x),
and g′(x) with source T′(x) are solutions to the field equation as seen from the
same frame.
Now let H be a so-called hole13 in spacetime in the sense that within this region
no matter content is present, i.e. T(x) = 0; outside H, on the other hand, T(x)
is non-null. Furthermore, let g(x) be the metric content of spacetime, necessarily
non-null both inside and outside the hole, and φ an active coordinate transforma-
tion with the property that it is equal to the identity outside H and different from
the identity inside H; demand also that the transformation be continuous at the
boundary of H. The property of general covariance of Einstein’s field equation
now implies that the unchanged g(x), with unchanged source T(x), is a solution
outside H; inside H, where no matter content is present, both g(x) and g′(x) are
(mathematically distinct) solutions. Einstein’s conclusion was that, their mathe-
matical differences notwithstanding, g(x) and g′(x) must be physically the same or
else the field equation would not be causal, since both metric fields are produced
by the same source outside H. The only way to avoid this dire consequence was
for Einstein to postulate the unreality of spacetime points since, in this manner, the
above active transformation of the metric field does not entail that there should be
any observational differences.14
There would be nothing remarkable about this conclusion if spacetime points
were otiose objects that contributed nothing to our physical understanding. Yet
that is not the case. The concept of field as a localized physical magnitude (whether
scalar, vectorial or tensorial), on which so much of our scientific portrayal of the
world (not just spacetime theories) is based, rests on the notion of point in order
to have any meaning. In other words, points are intrinsic to the very concept of
physical field.
In this respect, Auyang wrote:
The spatiotemporal structure is an integral aspect of the field. . .We
13The hole argument has been reviewed in innumerable places. See e.g. (Stachel, 1989, pp. 71–
81), where relevant quotations and a full list of early references can be found.
14Notice that only the hole argument applied to general relativity leads to the physical unreality
of spacetime points. In special relativity, for example, the absolutely given metric field η can be
used to set up an inertial frame with respect to which spacetime points become physical events.
In general relativity, on the other hand, there is no such possibility until the metric field g(x) has
been obtained as a solution to Einstein’s field equation; however, herein lies the problem: this field
equation is not causal unless spacetime points are held to be physically unreal. See (Stachel, 1989,
p. 78).
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can theoretically abstract it and think about it while ignoring the dy-
namical aspect of the field, but our thinking does not create things of
independent existence. . . (Auyang, 2001, p. 214)
He further criticized Earman’s remarks that
When relativity theory banished the ether, the space-time manifold M
began to function as a kind of dematerialized ether needed to support
fields. (Earman, 1989, p. 155)
We agree with Auyang’s view that “spacetime” (spacetime points) is not merely a
substratum on which to mathematically define fields. Spacetime points are inherent
in fields inasmuch as they perform the physical task of localizing the latter. This
is what, after Weyl (1949), Auyang (2001, p. 209) called the “this” or “here-now”
aspect of a field, additional to its “thus” or qualitative aspect. In this view, space-
time points satisfy the traditional label of “unobserved actors not acted upon,” and
hence our interpretation of points as an ether. However, although we also concur
with Auyang in that points are the illusive creations of our geometric thinking, we
do not offhand renounce the possibility that empty spacetime—beyond its geomet-
ric description—be real on its own, and not simply an illusion of our brains: might
it not still be observable as a stand-alone entity?
A case in favour of the physical reality of spacetime points, despite the odds
against them, was put forward by Friedman (1983, pp. 216–263). According to
him, the core of an explanation of natural phenomena is to be able to reduce a wide
variety of them to a single framework (Friedman, 1974), so that what one is required
to believe is not a vast range of isolated representational structures, but a single,
all-encompassing construct. However, in order to provide scientific understanding,
theoretical entities with sufficient unifying power must be taken to be of a literal
kind. Thus, Friedman argued that denying the existence of spacetime points—
themselves essential for geodesics to exist—can only lead to a loss of unifying and
explanatory power in spacetime theories.
As appealing as this argument may be, it is defeated by a look at history itself.
If anything has been learnt from the narration of the history of the old ether, it
should be this: no other conception gripped the minds of so many illustrious men
of science for longer and more strongly than that of the ether. It was always held to
be physically real and unified a wide range of phenomena (light, heat, gravitation,
electricity and magnetism) despite its relentlessly unobservable existence. And yet,
at the opening of the twentieth century, it became superfluous and useless, and was
declared nonexistent.
Evidently, no spell of time during which a conception proves to be extremely
successful is long enough to declare it real because of its utility or unifying power.
What is to guarantee that today’s extremely successful spacetime points—our geo-
metric ether—will not run, in their own due time, the same fate as their mechanical
ancestor? If any concept that is of aid in physics is to be held real, nothing more
and nothing less should be demanded of it that it be observable.
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Now, in studying current theoretical pictures comprised under the generic label
of quantum gravity (including pregeometry), one can notice that their overall trend
is not to try to overcome the geometric ether as here explained by attempts to
observe empty spacetime, but to create ever more involved metric (i.e. non-empty)
instantiations of it and then, possibly, to observe those. In other words, quantum
gravity has come to be an attempt to replace general relativity’s quantitatively
geometric picture of spacetime by other equally quantitatively geometric pictures
which, at the same time, include unobservable geometric objects.
In this respect, Brans (1999, pp. 597–602) argued that much by way of directly
unobservable structure is taken for granted in current spacetime theories, such as
the existence of a point set, a topology, smoothness, a metric, etc. He compared the
vortices and atoms of the mechanical ether with these unobservable building blocks
of spacetime and, moreover, with the yet considerably more complex spacetime
structures and “superstructures” devised more recently. We interpret Brans to be
asking: will strings and membranes, spin networks and foams, nodes and links—
to name but a few—appear a hundred years from now like the mechanical ether
does today? Are the above the new geometric counterparts of the old mechanical
contraptions?
Be this as it may, even if these more recently proposed structures were not to fol-
low such a fate and could eventually be observed, the observations relating to them
would give evidence of a new quantitatively geometric constitution of spacetime—
therefore, of a filled spacetime.15 However, if one’s endeavour is to advance the
understanding of empty spacetime, then one must move away from matter and
geometry—forwards on a new path.
5 Beyond the geometric ether
Is Einstein’s conclusion (Section 4) that there is nothing beyond the gravitational
“ether” g(x) final, then? It is not as long as an issue remains. Might it not be
possible to observe this “nothing,” the geometric ether? Can one find observables
intrinsic to empty spacetime itself?
The story of the mechanical ether is repeating itself today in a geometric, instead
of mechanical, guise. The old ether was superseded by stripping it of all its intrinsic,
mechanical properties and rendering them superfluous; the old ether did not exist.
The new ether is also unobservable as the old one and as problematic, in the sense
that it hints at the presence of an unresolved physical issue: from where observable
does empty spacetime’s physical capacity to “localize fields” come? To answer this
question, the new ether must, like its ancestor, have another layer of its nature
revealed, again by stripping it of its intrinsic properties: this time, geometric ones.
Our belief is that, having gone beyond the geometric ether, i.e. beyond geometry
15Hypothetical observation of the effects of a spacetime lattice (e.g. Smolin, 2004, p. 64) could
perhaps be argued as indirect evidence of the vertices themselves, but certainly also as the effects
of the lattice’s full metric structure.
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entirely, observables intrinsic to empty spacetime might be identified.
To put it differently, we are here proposing an updated version of Larmor’s
centenary words:
We should not be tempted towards explaining the simple group of re-
lations which have been found to define the activity of the aether by
treating them as mechanical consequences of concealed structure in that
medium; we should rather rest satisfied with having attained to their
exact dynamical correlation, just as geometry explores or correlates,
without explaining, the descriptive and metric properties of space.16
Larmor’s statement is remarkable for its correctness, and all the more remarkable
for its incorrectness. Its first half (up to the semicolon) is a correct testimony of
what soon would prove itself the way out of the mechanical ether problem: its
denial by special relativity. Its second half was—at the time of its utterance—a
correct comparison between the way Larmor thought the mechanical ether should
be considered and the way geometry was then regarded, namely, not as background
for the explanation of phenomena. However, 16 years later in 1916 the ether would
be overtly17 reinstated as a dynamic field, and the physical properties of spacetime
would be explained by it in the sense of a geometric substratum. This trend of
attempting to explain phenomena in terms of geometry did not stop with general
relativity but continued with the efforts of quantum gravity and, in particular, of so-
called pregeometry. Therefore, nowadays geometry does explain, as a substratum,
the properties of spacetime, and the second part of Larmor’s view is no longer
correct.
The updated version of Larmor’s words proposed here reads thus—We should
not be tempted towards explaining the simple group of relations (fields’ local aspect)
which have been found to define the activity of the geometric ether (spacetime
points) by treating them as consequences of concealed structure in that geometric
medium; we should rather seek to explain the activity of the geometric ether beyond
its geometric nature, searching for observables intrinsic to empty spacetime via
non-geometric concepts.
Unlike Larmor, we do not renounce an explanation of the geometric ether, but
we do not attempt to find it at the same conceptual level as this ether finds itself.
Our search for spacetime observables requires taking a conceptual step beyond
the state of affairs as left by Einstein’s hole argument. We believe that the current
philosophical literature on this problem (e.g. Butterfield, 1989; Earman & Norton,
1987; Rynasiewicz, 1994, 1996) has not been able to take this step by adding
something physically new to the discussion. On the contrary, the philosophical
debate appears to function in the spirit of Earman’s (1989) words, which measure
the fruitfulness of a work by asking “How many discussions does it engender?”
16Quoted from (Whittaker, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 303).
17In fact, Newton’s space had already assumed this role over 200 hundred years before, and
special relativity’s inertial spacetime 11 years before (see Section 3), but neither of them had been
openly considered as spaces with physical geometric properties until after 1916.
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(p. xi). What is needed is a new physical insight by means of which the present
philosophical debate may be rendered inconsequential, much like the older disputes
as to the shape and position of the Earth or the nature of the heavenly bodies were
only settled by new physical investigations.
In order to understand how our step beyond the hole argument is related to the
hole argument itself, we will now re-rehearse it but this time in geometric, rather
than coordinate, language and for a general field. Let there be two points, P and
Q, inside H linked by a diffeomorphism φ(P ) = Q, and let each of them be the
local aspect, or location, of fields f(P ) and f ′(Q), respectively, solutions to the field
equation with the same source. The demand that
f(P ) = f ′(Q) (1)
(cf. g(x) = g′(x′)) reproduces geometrically the requirement that, after a coordinate
transformation x 7→ x′, a physical situation remains unchanged. In terms of an
active transformation, point P (cf. x) is dropped, and f(P ) is now represented only
in terms of Q (cf. x′) by its push-forward
φ∗[f(P )] = f [φ(P )] = f(Q). (2)
This is also a solution, but
f(Q) 6= f ′(Q) (3)
(cf. g(x′) 6= g′(x′)).18 Again, in order to preserve the causality of the field equation,
one postulates diffeomorphism invariance, i.e. that “displacements” of points lead
to no observable effects and that, therefore, points have no physical reality.
How to move forward, then? We note that the meaning of the postulate stated
above is only at face value so. On closer inspection, diffeomorphism invariance
involves only the weaker requirement that points be all alike, i.e. have no physical
identity; thereby, the problem posed by the hole argument is avoided, since having
physically indistinguishable spacetime points makes g(P ) and φ∗[g(P )] physically
equivalent.
In order to appreciate why having physically indistinguishable points solves the
hole argument, one must clearly recognize the difference between mathematical
and physical points. Mathematical points may very well be labelled points but, as
Stachel remarked,
[N]o mathematical coordinate system is physically distinguished per se;
and without such a distinction there is no justification for physically
identifying the points of a [mathematical] manifold. . . as physical events
in space-time. Thus, the mathematician will always correctly regard the
18It would have been more natural to denote Q by P ′ and later to perform an active trans-
formation dropping P ′ (cf. x′) instead of P (cf. x), in which case one would have obtained the
expressions f(P ) = f ′(P ′) instead of (1) and f(P ) 6= f ′(P ) instead of (3), more in tune with
Einstein’s original coordinate notation. However, remaining faithful to this starting point would
have somewhat obscured the notation in the investigation that follows at the end of this section.
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original and the dragged-along fields as distinct from each other. But
the physicist must examine this question in a different light. . . (Stachel,
1989, p. 75)
The physicist must, in this case, rather ask whether there is anything in empty
spacetime by means of which its points can be physically told apart from one
another—neither labels nor metrics can count to carry out the differentiation. Find-
ing there are no such means, the physicist must hold spacetime points physically
identical to one another.
However, having a multitude of physically indistinguishable spacetime points
does not necessarily mean that they must be physically meaningless in every other
way (cf. hydrogen atoms; see below).
An earlier attempt by one of us (Lehto, Nielsen, & Ninomiya, 1986a,b) in which
the principle of diffeomorphism invariance and quantum theory were both taken
into account, revealed that fields on a pregeometric lattice displayed quantum-
mechanical correlations. In that work, the quantum-mechanical framework was
realized via a path-integral formalism; within it, the requirement of diffeomorphism
invariance demanded that one ought to sum over all the vertices n in the partition
function Z, thus leading to the appearance of correlations. One the other hand,
the said requirement induced a free gas behaviour19 of the vertices, which helped
to avoid the rise of long-range correlations.20
Although we do not plan to follow this earlier approach, we rescue from it the
insinuation that the said principle and quantum theory—the only branch of natural
science so far forced to confront the problem of existence21—can lead together to the
result that physical fields can be mutually correlated in spacetime. We hold such
correlations to be the key to the possible identification of spacetime observables.
An analogy with matter that behaves quantum-mechanically may clarify in what
sense correlations can fulfill this task. Just like spacetime points are physically
identical, so are the hydrogen atoms conforming a gas of this element. However,
denying the reality of hydrogen atoms on these grounds does not seem at all rea-
sonable (Horwich, 1978, p. 409; Friedman, 1983, p. 241). Hydrogen atoms, despite
being identical, possess a property that spacetime points do not seem to have: they
interact with other matter and correlate with one another creating bonds, hydro-
gen molecules. Holding the hydrogen molecules to be our sought-for observables
for the sake of this analogy,22 their measurable properties now give evidence of the
existence of the physically identical atoms.
19Free gas behaviour in this case means that any pair of vertices can with high probability have
any mutual distance.
20The correlation function |〈f(P )f(Q)〉− 〈f(P )〉〈f(Q)〉| for fields on the lattice was found to be
non-null, although correlations were nevertheless semi-local, i.e. actually tending to zero exponen-
tially as the distance between two lattice points P and Q increased.
21See (Isham, 1995, p. 65).
22In a genuinely empty spacetime, points could only “interact” among themselves. Therefore,
the interaction of the hydrogen atoms with e.g. their container’s walls is an analogy we cannot
pursue.
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Forty years ago, Wheeler touched upon an idea somewhat similar to ours within
the context of his so-called “bucket of dust.” He wrote:
Two points between which any journey was previously very long have
suddenly found themselves very close together. However sudden the
change is in classical theory, in quantum theory there is a probability
amplitude function which falls off in the classically forbidden domain.
In other words, there is some residual connection between points which
are ostensibly very far apart. (Wheeler, 1964, p. 498)
However, Wheeler did not develop this idea, but only used it in order to reject
his quantum-mechanical concept of nearest neighbour, according to the manner in
which he had previously defined it.
In order to display the physically new idea of spacetime correlations within the
existing context of the hole argument—but moving, at the same time, beyond it—
we proceed as follows. In an otherwise empty spacetime, a field f(P ) at point P
dragged onto another point Q,
φ∗[f(P )] = f [φ(P )] = f(Q), (4)
and then pulled back again, φ∗[f(Q)], could carry properties pertaining to Q back
with it, so that a comparison of f(P ) and φ∗[f(Q)] could yield that they are phys-
ically different.
This is not to say that we expect to find new physics by means of a purely
mathematical operation plus its inverse. It rather means that, given the insight
that indistinguishable points may nonetheless display physical effects by correlating
with each other quantum-mechanically, then the above analysis constitutes a means
to represent the ensuing broken physical symmetry of diffeomorphism invariance.
Moreover, when we speak of “moving points,” no physical system is actually being
displaced in the physical world; the physical meaning of the expressions above (and
below) ultimately falls back on spacetime correlations, the existence of which is
here conjectured.
Given f(P ), the appearance of the pull-back φ∗[f(Q)] rests on the need to
compare locally the original field and the original field restored. This need arises
from the fact that physical experiments are not performed globally but locally. An
analogy close at hand is that of parallel transport in general relativity. Given two
vector fields ~v(P ) and ~v(Q) in curved spacetime, they can only be compared by
computing ∆~v at one point P by parallel-transporting the latter field:
∆~v(P ) = ~v(Q)‖ − ~v(P ). (5)
The analogy works best for the case of a small, closed loop with sides ∆a~e1 and
∆b~e2. In this case, the field ~v(P ) is compared to itself after having travelled the
loop and returned to its original position;
∆~v(P ) = ∆a∆bR( , ~v(P ), ~e1, ~e2), (6)
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where R is the Riemann tensor, quantifies how much the components—but not the
size—of ~v(P ) have been changed by the experience. Similarly, if instead of thinking
of a field as a mere value, we visualize it as a vector f , and f(P ) as a component
of f , then a new dimension to the hole argument is revealed: the local comparison
of φ∗[f(Q)] and f(P ) quantifies how much the field component f(P )—but not the
field’s value—changes due to the possible correlation of P with Q; in short, f as a
vector would behave like ~v. This change would stem from any physical reality of
quantum-mechanical origin that the points may have; pictorially speaking, P would
behave as if it “remembered” having “interacted” with Q, remaining “entangled”
with it.
Now in the same manner that the parallel-transport procedure constitutes the
mathematical representation of a physical property of spacetime—namely, its curva-
ture—so does our description intend to represent a new kind of physical property—
namely, spacetime correlations. Further, just as curvature reveals itself as the
active effect of spacetime’s geometric structure and may well be viewed as a sort of
lingering connection between the points on the loop, the correlations we envision
would likewise unveil themselves as the active effect of a persistent connection
between spacetime points. However, in this case, we must search for the source of
this connection somewhere else, within a deeper layer of the nature of things (see
below).
The challenge now is to find observables which reveal this possible behaviour
of field f(P ), since fields alone are not observable as such. In this connection,
we note with Einstein (1952b, pp. 119, 121, 131; 1970, p. 71; 1982, p. 47) that
the intervals ds2—and not the metric field—are the fundamental constituents of
general relativity: the theory is essentially about an observable network of invariant
intervals between events. Through the intervals, a featureless spacetime acquires
geometric structure, which then can be characterized via the metric tensor (and
the inner product), thus:
ds2 = d~s · d~s =
(
∂~s
∂xµ
∣∣∣
P
dxµ
)
·
(
∂~s
∂xν
∣∣∣
P
dxν
)
=
(
∂~s
∂xµ
∣∣∣
P
·
∂~s
∂xν
∣∣∣
P
)
dxµdxν
= gµν(P )dx
µdxν. (7)
In keeping with this crucial realization about ds2, the interval between points
suggests itself as the main candidate for a spacetime observable. One could ex-
plore23 whether the interval
ds2PP ′ = gµν(P )dx
µdxν (8)
between two points24 remains unchanged after gµν(P ) is pushed forward, φ
∗[gµν(P )],
23Here P ′ and Q′ are points in the neighbourhoods of P and Q respectively, and are linked by
a diffeomorphism φ(P ′) = Q′, in the same way that P and Q are.
24Special care must be taken here not to confuse points with events.
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to get
ds2QQ′ = φ
∗[gµν(P )]dx
µdxν
= gµν(Q)dx
µdxν , (9)
and subsequently pulled back, φ∗[gµν(Q)], to get for the original interval
φ∗[gµν(Q)]dx
µdxν . (10)
If spacetime points had any physical reality, the final expression (10) could not be
equal to the initial one (8), and there would be some long-range correlations seen
in the line element.
This would not upset general relativity because, as said above, the envisioned
correlations represent a new kind of effect rather than corrections to already-known
physical magnitudes, and therefore do not challenge the existing predictions of this
theory. Moreover, at a conceptual level, the diffeomorphism invariance principle and
the hole argument’s conclusion are not upset either, since these belong in general
relativity’s classical, geometric description of spacetime, which does not consider
quantum theory at all and, therefore, must view quantum-mechanical correlations
as an element foreign to its framework. In particular and furthering the previous
analogy, we may say that the local comparison between φ∗[f(Q)] and f(P ) deals
with changes in the components of the field, whereas the hole argument refers to
(lack of) changes in the value of the fields. Thus, the classical, geometric theory of
general relativity remains untouched from this perspective.
Indeed, consistent with the general relativistic picture, it is not, strictly speak-
ing, possible for the correlations we envision to be displayed by ds2PP ′ as a geometric
notion, i.e. as a distance between points. We interpret the appearance of quantum-
mechanical correlations as an indication that there must be something amiss with
the current geometric description—which leads to the futile problem of the geomet-
ric ether—and as evidence of physical things beyond geometry.25 In other words,
we understand what we presently describe geometrically as “correlations between
spacetime points” to be in fact the effect of quantum-mechanical, metageometric
things. In particular, we expect the geometric interval ds2PP ′ to result as a geometric
remnant or trace of such things.
To visualize our meaning, consider the following extension of the earlier parallel-
transport analogy. Due to its homogeneity, a flat Euclidean spacetime is ster-
ile as far as observables related to its physical geometry are concerned; a curved
(pseudo-)Riemannian spacetime, on the other hand is not: the parallel transport of
25In fact, the consideration of quantum-mechanical ideas in themselves involves, from our point
of view, the need for non-geometric physical things. In a future article, we will present quantum
theory on the basis of measurement results ai, and metageometric premeasurement and transition
things, P(ai) and P(aj |ai), familiar to human experience. We will argue that, when viewed in
this manner, the theory gets rid of some of the philosophical problems that plague it (e.g. the
geometric state vector |ψ〉 and its controversial ontology; cf. the geometric points P and their
controversial ontology).
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a field around a closed loop uncovers a previously hidden geometric observable, this
spacetime’s curvature. A similar relationship holds now between a vacated general-
relativistic spacetime and what we envision as a metageometric realm: whereas the
former is completely homogenous concerning its elementary points (diffeomorphism
symmetry) and, therefore, sterile with respect to empty spacetime observables, the
latter metageometric realm may uncover currently hidden spacetime observables
as residual effects of the quantum-mechanical connection between metageometric
things.
It is through these things beyond geometry that we aspire to achieve the earlier
anticipated conceptual overthrow of the geometric ether. This is the sense, then,
in which we intend the question that serves as the title of this article, and in this
sense only that we intend to pursue an answer to it. In this light, one should regard
points the way one would Wittgenstein’s (1922) ladder: as concepts to be discarded
after one “has climbed out through them, on them, over them” (§ 6.54).
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